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RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Defendanits were sued for 'villf ul trespass for traveling on roads traversing plaintiff's land connecting the
public highway and the National Forest. Plaintiff sought
compensatory and punitive damages and injuctive relief.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Judge found that the Davenport road was a public
thoroughfare and defendants travel on it was not a trespass. However, their travel on the Buck Springs Road
(called Ridge Road by plaintiff in his brief) was a trespass.
Damages were assessed at $10.00 nominal and contrary
to plaintiff's assertion in his brief, he was awarded costs.
l

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek affirmation of that part of the Court's
Judgment declaring Davenport Road public and holding
that plaintiff is not entitled to punitive damages; and reversal of that part which holds that the Buck Springs Road
is private and assess damages and costs agai~st the defendants.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
For several years defendants and the public had access
road to the Cache National Forest in the Buck Springs area
from Utah Highway 39 across land owned by plaintiff.
The access consists of ::i dirt road which divides to become
the Davenport Canyon Road and the Buck Springs Road.
This is the only vehicular way into Buck Springs. It has
been used over the years by hunters, campers, picknicers,
sight seers, forest officials, State Fish and Game personnel
and stockmen. The use has heen without restriction of any
kind. In 1965 for the first time, plaintiff caused a 'no
trespassing' sign to be erected, and a cable placed across
the road. Defendants believing the roads to be public went
around the cable and traveled as before. On this occasion,
they were informed by plaintiff that the roads were private.
The following year, 1966, after conferring with a Forest
::3ervice official and an official of State Fish and Game ~nd
receiving the information that the roads were public, they
once again travelled these roads going in on Davenport
and returning on Buck Springs. This trip in 1966 resulted
in the instant law suit. Plaintiff admits the public use of
the roads, but complains about interference with his
sheep business by hunters afoot and in vehicles. Most of the
complaints are direoted to persons on his property off of
the roads in question and serve as justification for closing
Dll of his land to hunting. Defendants assert that the roads
traversed have been and are now "public thoroughfares".

ARGUMENT
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY RULED
THAT THE DAVENPORT CANYON ROAD
WAS PUBLIC. BUT ERRED IN RULING THAT
THE BUCK SPRINGS ROAD PRIVATE.
The National Forest is available to the public for its
highest and be~t use including timber production, grazing,
hunting, camping and general public recreation (T 138,
139). The only reasonable access and the only vehicular
access to the Buck Springs area is over the roads in question (T 12). The plaintiff Nick Chournos testified (T 101) :
"Q : Is there any other access by vehicle?

A: There isn't. The Forest Service wants them to go
in there, they can take a bulldozer up there and fix
them a road. They don't have to go through me.
Q: Is there any other access by motor vehicle down
into Buck Springs other than across this road that
traverses section 27?

A: I just got through telling you they come up from
the west side in the Buck Springs area.
Q : By motor vehicle?

A : Yes, sir. Not on top of the Buck Springs, but onto
the hill to the west.
Q: Can they get into Buck Springs?

A: Not with a car."

all year around ( T 73) . There was just too many hunter!\.
Everywhere you looked there was a hunter (T 106).
There's been thousands of them stuck (T 108).
The use was unrestricted (T 52) until 1965. No permission was asked or granted. Plaintiff "let them go hunting until - - - (63 or 64) - - - when we decided to close
it (T 72) ."
The plaintiff's son, Samuel N. Chournos, testified
as follows: (T 114)
Q : Well you tell me what happened. That's all I want
to know, is what happened.

A: Sixty-four is the first year we closed our property
to hunting. We published it in the paper, we done
everything we could. We notified our personal friends
and relatives that it 'M:ts closed, that there would be
no hunting or no trespassing in the area. Prior ti
that time we let anyone hunt in the area in the regular
season.
Q: Anyone at all that wanted to trtavel across and

go on these roads, you had no objection to?
A: No.

Q: In other words, it wasn't just a situation where

only those you invited came on ; the general public
came across?
A: Right.

Q : And for how many years did that go on?
A : As long 1as I've been up there.
Q : And how long has that been ?

A: All my life.
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Clark Anderson, retired Forest Ranger with many years
experience in this area stated there was no other access
except by the road in question ( T 155).
The Davenport Canyon Road appeared as a trail on
a survey approved by the surveyor General on February
22, 1879 (Exhibit 18). The Buck Springs Road apparently
was in existence in 1925 (T 93, 94). Most of the evidence
as to use applied to both roads. They were used by Mr.
Chournos from 1925 when he pulled his camp down with
a wagon and team of horses (T 93, 94). Also, in the early
days use was made by saddle and pack horses. The public
h:as driven across for many years (T 98). In 1932, Frank
Frazer had his camp wagon at Buck Springs. Clark Anderson has taken his sedan over both of the roads since 1936,
and has observed constant use of them since 1932 (T 152)
by hunters and others (T 153) (T 160). Roy Stoker used
both roads 15 or 16 years\ago (T 172, 173). The defendant,
Lester Bell, has used the roads for the last 11 years (T 183,
184) with his party; Lamar D. Hansen and his party since
1940. They appear on the forest service system of roads as
existing rqads (T 122) and are shown in existence by
aerial photos taken in 1952 (Exhibit 19). The record
establishes constant use by the public long in excess of 10
years.
The following are statements made by the plaintiff's
witnesses:
Hundreds of hunters in 1964 (T 23). Hunting people
increased over a hundred fold (T 36). A hundred cars
would be going down in the day time (T 44). Heavy influx of hunters for 10 yearSI (T 52). The road has been
there as long as Robert Whiteny can remember (T 66).
Hunting in the area since 1925 (T 72). They are hunting
5

Q: Well, what are yon'? About 28 or 29?

A: Thirty-five.

Q : Are you? And your recollection would go back
to when, about ten or something?
A : Well, not in the deer season. I would have been
there since I was about sixteen.
Defendants did not damage the land of plaintiff
(T 97) 1and traveled on the roads in good faith believing
them to be public (T 13, 14, 15, 31, 188 and 204). There
was no evidence of wilful and malicious trespass
Apparently the plaintiff's. land where these roads are
located was public domain until 1925 (T 93). The area
was not reserved 1as National Forest land until 1937 (T 130).

Jeremy v. Bertagnole, et al, 101 U 1, 116 P 2, 420
(1941) referring to Lindsay Land & Live Stock Co. v.
Chournos, 75 Utah 304, 385, 285 P 646, 647 (1921)
states:
"By act of Congress passed in 1866, Revised
Statutes US. Sec. 2477 (re USCA Sec 932), provided:
'The right of way for the construction of high·
ways over public lands, not reserved for public
uses is hereby granted'
,By this act' said the Court in Streeter v
Stainaker, 61 Neb. 205, 85 NW 47, 48, 'the govern·
ment consented that any of its lands not reserved
for a public purpose might be taken and used for
public roads The statute was a standing offer of
a free right of way over the public domain, and as
soon as it was accepted in an appropriate manner
by the agellJts of the public, or the public itself, a
highway was established.'
6

"It has been held Ly numerous courts that the grant
may be accepted by public use without former action by
public authorities, and that continued use of the road by
the public for such length of time and under such circumstances as to clearly indicate an intention on the part of
the public to accept the grant is sufficient ... "
1

The following Utah Code provisions apply:
27-12-89, UC.A., 1953, as amended:
"Public use constituting dedication - - A highway
shall be deemed to have been dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public when it has been
continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a
period of ten years."
27-12-90, U.C.A, 1953, as amended:
Highways once established continue until abandoned - - All public highways once e3tablished shall
continue to be highways until abandoned or vacated by order of the highway authorities having
jurisdiction over any such highway, or by other
competent authority."

Boyer v. Clark, May 2, 1958, 7 U (2d) 394, 326 P
2d 107 involved a wagon trail from State Highway 133
over a ridge into Grass Creek. It was held in that case that
the evidence was sufficient to establish a highway by
dedication because the public, even though not consisting
of a great many persons, made a continuous and uninterrupted use of the road as often as they found it convenient
and necessary.

Clark v. Erekson, 9 Ut 2d 212, 341 P pd 424 (Ju/ 11
8, 1959). The evidence in this case showed use of the lan~
by walking or riding in wagons, and later on, in auto.
mobiles by people going to fish in Little Cottonwood
Creek. There was no evidence thiat permission was sought
or given. It was held that this was sufficient to establish
a dedication of the road by user.
The Jeremy v. Bertagnole case, supra, found that the
road used by the public generally for all necessary and
convenient purposes, including pedestrian, vehicular and
equestrain traffic, and trailing of cattle, horses and sheep,
for more than sixty years was, a public road or highway.

Lindsay Land & Lii•estock Co. v. Chournos, at al, Oct.
1, 1929, 285, P 646 is similar in many aspects to the instant
case.
"The lands over which the highway is claimed are
unenclosed and uninhabited mountain lands, suitable only for grazing purposes, and situated near
the southern border of Cache County. The road
extends across the lands in a general easterly and
westerly direction following a part of its distance
throug'h ·a narrow canyon or pass called Davenport Canyon. At the eastern terminus of the road
is a large area of mountain land valuable for
grazing animal~ in the summer season, a portion
of which is now the Cache National Forest, and a
portion of which is private ownership. This area
has been extensively used for summer grazing for
many years by owners of sheep Who trailed them
over the route in question from the settled portions of the county lying to west, to the summer
range in the spring of the year and back again in
the fall.

"It is contended, however, that the use of the road,
as proved, was not such as amounted to a continuous and uninterrupted use as a public thoroughfare.
And in this connection it is argued that the uses
made of the road for sawmill and mining purposes
were of a temporary character, and the use of it
for trailing sheep was infrequeunt and occasional
and over an uncertain course.
" ..... While it is difficult to fix a standard by
which to measure what is a public use or a public
thoroughfare, it can be said here that the road was
used by many and diff erenrt persons for a variety
of purposes; that it was open to all who desired
to use it; that the use made of it was as general
and extensive as the situation and surroundingR
would permit, had the road been formally laid out
as a public highway by public authority. We
therefore conclude that the Court was justified in
finding that the roadi had been continuously and
uninterruptedly used as a public thoroughfare for
more than ten years."
CONCLUSION
The evidence establishes the Buck Springs Road and
Davenport Canyon Road are public and that no trespass
occurred.
Respectfully submitted,
LaVAR E. STARK
of Alsup 'and Stark
3755 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84403
Attorneys for Defendants
and Respondents
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